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ATTORNEYS' FEES-MAIMuM ATTORNEY'S FEE ALLOWABLE
FOR REPRESENTATION OF DISABILITY CLAIMANT UNDER SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT LIMITED TO TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF CLAIM-
ANT'S ACCRUED BENEFITS; DEPENDENTS ACCRUED BENEFITS
EXCLUDED FROM COMPUTATION OF FEE. Hopkins v. Gardner
(7th Cir. 1967).
Raymond Hopkins received disability insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act in 1961 and 1962; his wife and children received
benefits as the wife and dependents of an individual entitled to dis-
ability benefits.2 The United States Department of Health, Education
and Welfare notified Hopkins that it considered him fit for work and
that the benefit payments would terminate in December, 1962. In
1964, after exhausting administrative remedies, Hopkins brought
an action for recovery in the district court, which reversed the decision
of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and ordered the
Department to pay the accrued benefits from December, 1962. The
Department notified Hopkins that since it had been decided that he
was still disabled, he and his family would continue to receive bene-
fit payments along with their past-due payments.4 The district court
awarded Hopkins' attorney a fee of 25 percent of the past-due
benefits payable to Hopkins alone.5
On appeal 6 to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the issue
of the amount of the attorney's fee, held, affirmed: A reasonable
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423 (1965).
2 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (d) (1965).
3 Hereinafter referred to as Secretary.
4 Hopkins received individual past-due benefits through December, 1965, totalling
$3,744.80, his wife received $1,287.80, and the children $3,463.50.
5 Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1965), as amended, (Supp. I 1966).
(b) (i)
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under
this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the
court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee
for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the
past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such
judgment, and the Secretary may, notwithstanding the provisions of section
405(i) of this title, certify the amount of such fee for payment to such
attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due bene-
fits. In case of any such judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified
for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.
(A ny attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services
rendered in connection with proceedings before a court to which para-
graph (1) is applicable, any amount in excess of that allowed by the court
thereunder shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof
shall be subject to a fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
6 This appeal was, in actuality, brought by Hopkins' attorney, Mr. Allen Sharp, of
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attorney's fee is to be determined by the district court. The maximum
fee allowable is 25 percent of the claimant's accrued benefits. In
computing this fee, past-due benefits received by the claimant's de-
pendents are not considered. Hopkins v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 726
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 88 Sup. Ct. 71 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1967)
(No. 276).
The Hopkins case brings into focus the conflict between the circuit
courts in the interpretation of the 1965 amendment to the Social
Security Act which limits an attorney's fee to 25 percent of a favor-
able judgment.7 The Fourth Circuit interprets the amendment to
include 25 percent of the past-due benefits payable to both the pri-
mary claimant and his dependents, 8 while the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits hold that the fee base can be established only on the primary
claimant's past-due benefits.9
Prior to the enactment of 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) (1), there was
no provision in the Social Security Act determining allowable attor-
neys' fees for representation of a claimant before the district court.
Since the Social Security Act was silent in this respect, the courts had
determined that whenever the matter was properly presented to a
court, it had the authority to determine the amount of counsel fees.'0
It had also been decided that a contract between an adult claimant
and his attorney would not be set aside because the adult claimant
could obligate himself to pay for the representation." These con-
tracts were usually contingent-fee arrangements under which the
attorney received a percentage of the accrued benefits if the case was
conducted to a successful conclusion.
Moreover, before the enactment of the 1965 amendment there was
no legislative requirement that the Secretary pay fees directly to
attorneys. However, the courts which determined the amount of fees
in proper cases ordered the fees paid by the Secretary.' 2 This was
Williamsport, Indiana. See Sims v. Gardner, 378 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1967), petiion for
cert. filed, CCH U.S. S. CT. BULL., 1967-1968 Term, at 7007, where the attorney also
brought the appeal for review of the fee awarded.
7 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1) [hereinafter referred to as amendment].
8 Redden v. Celebrezze, 370 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1966).
9 Hopkins v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1967); Sims v. Gardner, 378 F.2d
70 (6th Cir. 1967).
10 Folsom v. McDonald, 237 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1956). In the Folsom case, the
proper presentation was brought by counsel in an action by an infant suing by guardian
ad litem; the court directed the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to pay the
counsel from the infant's claim.
11 Gonzalez v. Hobby, 213 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1954).
12 Celebrezze v. Sparks, 342 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1965). The government contested
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considered necessary to assure attorneys that they would receive their
fees from claimants who were often in poor financial conditions.
Section 406(b) (1) was recommended to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.'3 The
Department proposed this amendment not only for the claimant's
benefit in reducing the attorneys' fees, but also to provide the manner
whereby attorneys would be paid directly by the Department. Such
direct payment would insure the collection of the fee, thus attracting
more attorneys to represent social security claimants. To accomplish
this purpose, Congress expressly exempted the payment of attorneys'
fees from the certification restriction of section 405 (1).14 Although
there is a dearth of material from which to draw, apparently the
Legislature's primary intent was to reduce the amount of the fees
that the attorneys were charging under contingent-fee contracts. 5
However, Congress did not express its intent to accomplish this by
limiting the fee base solely to the primary claimant's accrued bene-
fits.Y0
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the amendment in Lambert v.
Celebrezze,'7 and Redden v. Celebrezze,18 which were joined for
the power of the court to order the Secretary to withhold the fee awarded the attorney
from the claimant's back award on the basis that it violated section 205(i) (now §
405(i), of the Social Security Act). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(i) (1965). CERTIFICATION
FOR PAYMENT.
Upon final decision of the Secretary or upon final judgment of any court of
competent jurisdiction, that any person is entitled to any payment or payments
under this subchapter, the Secretary shall certify to the Managing Trustee
the name and address of the person so entitled to receive such payment or
payments, the amount of such payment or payments, and the time at which
such payment or payments should be made, and the Managing Trustee, through
the Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department, and prior to any
action thereon by the General Accounting Office, shall make payment in
accordance with the Certification of the Secretary ....
13 Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. pt. 1, at 513 (1965).
14 Id.
15 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1965), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1965, at 2062.
It has come to the attention of the committee that attorneys have upon
occasion charged what appear to be inordinately large fees for representing
claimants in Federal district court actions arising under the social security
program. Usually, these large fees result from a contingent-fee arrangement
under which the attorney is entitled to a percentage (frequently one-third to
one-half) of the accrued benefits. Since litigation necessarily involves a con-
siderable lapse of time, in many cases large amounts of accrued benefits, and
consequently large legal fees, are payable if the claimant wins his case.
10 See Hearings on H.R. 6675, supra note 12.
17 361 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1966) (where the attorney had a 50 percent contigent-fee
contract and the court awarded 25 percent of the accrued benefits of both the primary
insured and his dependents).
I8 361 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1966) (where the attorney also had a 50 percent con-
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rehearing,19 by deciding that the "past-due benefits to which claimant
is entitled by reason of such judgment ' 20 meant the entire benefits
payable to the primary claimant and his dependents.2 ' In considering
the question the court stated:
In the absence of particularized questions ... all of the claims are
of a part. In these cases .. . the only real issue is the disability of the
insured individual. Once that is established, allowance of the claims
of the other qualified members of the family is substantially auto-
matic. 22
Additionally, the court reasoned that Congress would not have
intended the fee base to be limited to the primary claimant, while at
the same time providing the attorney with a means to avoid the
statute by making all dependents named parties to the administrative
and judicial proceedings. 3
Reaching a contrary conclusion in the instant case, the Seventh
Circuit considered "claimant" the key word in the statute, and
asserted that no one could be a claimant unless he was a plaintiff in
the action. This factor would exclude "from the base on which the
maximum attorney's fee would be computed"24 the past-due benefits
of dependents not joined in the action. The court admitted, however,
that this was a procedural detail which the attorney could avoid by
joining all the parties as plaintiffs. Therefore, it turned to the question
of:
[W]hether "claimant" under this statute includes all persons whose
entitlement to benefits is established by the resolution of the issue
before the court, * * * or whether "claimant" * * * means only
the applicant for primary benefits in any case where [the appli-
cant's] entitlement is the issue.25
The Hopkin's court settled this issue by limiting the base to past-due
benefits payable to the primary claimant when his entitlement is the
only issue.
tingent-fee contract and the district court established the fee base to include the primary
claimant and his dependents).
19 Redden v. Celebrezze, 370 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1966).
20 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1).
21 370 F.2d at 375.
22 Id.
23 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1965) establishes a dependent's right to become a formal
party to the administrative hearings after an administrative decision, and under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (1965) a dependent, who has become a party to the administrative hearing,
can obtain judicial review of the primary claim of the insured individual.
24 374 F.2d at 729.
25 Id. at 730.
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The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Fourth Circuit had chosen
the broad interpretation by establishing the fee base from all past-
due benefits payable to primary claimants and dependents. But in
electing the narrower interpretation, it reasoned that the intent
and concern of Congress was the reduction of excessive fees charged
by attorneys. The court also decided that Congress assumed that the
individual applying for primary benefits would be the only claimant
before the court.2
Subsequently in Sims v. Gardner,7 the Sixth Circuit aligned itself
with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Hopkins by deciding:
Even if the district court could be certain that the question of the
insured's disability was the only precondition to the receipt of bene-
fits by the dependents, we would refrain from holding that a court
judgment determining the question of disability in favor of the
insured would permit the dependents' benefits to be used in fixing
the attorney's fee.2s
Thus, the Sims court would not allow a dependent's recovery to be
included in the fee base unless the attorney was required to expend
additional effort.
The circuit courts that have interpreted the statute narrowly have
depended upon Congress's repetitious use of the word "claimant" in
the singular form, and on the "expressed" intent of Congress to
limit "inordinately large fees.' 29 These courts extended their reason-
ing by explaining that only if the attorney is required to raise issues
necessary to meet the dependent's requirements to qualify for bene-
fits,30 should dependent's benefits be used in fixing the attorney's fee.
The argument follows that an attorney should not receive a larger
fee for representing a married claimant with dependents than for
representing a single one, unless there is an additional expenditure of
time and labor on the attorney's part.31
The Fourth Circuit in Redden realized the interdependency of the
disability claims under the Social Security Act and for this reason
26 Id.
27 378 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1967).
28 Id. at 72.
29 See 374 F.2d at 730; 378 F.2d at 71-72.
30 Issues necessary might be age, dependency, or relationship to the insured. 42
U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 402(d).
31 See 374 F.2d at 730; 378 F.2d at 72. This argument contradicts the reasoning
behind an ordinary contingent-fee arrangement where the fee of the attorney is strictly
contingent upon the size of the total recovery. Factors of time and energy expended, or
issues raised and met do not have to be shown, because all that is necessary is for the
attorney to bring the cause of action to a successful conclusion.
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interpreted the statute to include the benefits to the entire family
unit. 2 The limitations on a dependent's receipt of benefits are tin-
complicated. The wife of the disabled insured, under the Social
Security Act, is not entitled to benefits if she is under the age of 62
and has no children under the age of 18 who qualify for benefits.83
A child, to be entitled to benefits, must be under the age of 18 and
dependent for support upon the insured parent.a4 Accordingly, once
the primary claimant is found to be entitled to benefits, the wife's
and dependent's claims follow almost automatically. Therefore,
since the primary insured's claim was granted "by reason of a favor-
able judgment," the dependent's claim flows from the same judicial
determination.35
Although the expressed intent of Congress was to limit "inordi-
nately large fees,"3 6 there was no expression that "a judgment
favorable to a daimant"' 7 referred only to the primary insured's
benefits to the exclusion of the accrued benefits of the dependents.
Both the interpendency of disability claims under the Social Security
Act, and the fact that once the insured's claim is awarded it is
customary for the dependents to receive their benefits automatically,
must have been clearly known to Congress. It then would follow
that Congress intended to establish the maximum fee base on the
entire claim to benefits to which the family unit is entitled.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court should interpret section
406(b) (1) to include the accrued benefits to which the primary' in-
sured and his dependents are entitled in determining the fee base for
the attorney.
DONALD W. SCHMIDT
32 370 F.2d at 375.
38 42 U.S.C. § 402(b).
34 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
35 370 F.2d at 375.
36 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1965). U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 1965, at 2062.
87 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1).
